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I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the United States and international criminal
tribunals has lasted for almost 100 years at least. At first glance, a
chronology of the relationship would lead one to think that the United
States policy has been extremely inconsistent. This would be displayed
only after comparing the United States' dissent against an international
criminal tribunal after World War I (WWI), to the United States' support of
the International Military Tribunal (IMT) after World War H (WWII), and
its support of an International Criminal Court (ICC) at the Genocide
Convention.
Beginning in the early 1990's, the United States did not support a
Security Council (SC) international tribunal for Iraq, but later changed its
position as well as supported SC international tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In 1993, the United States supported the creation
of the permanent ICC, but later voted against it in 1998. Considering these
inconsistencies, it would seem that the United States does not have a
consistent policy regarding international criminal tribunals.
Taking a closer look at the chronology, a consistent position would
become clearer: the United States has not favored international criminal
tribunals when there is substantial risk of United States nationals being
* The author is Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at the Richard Stockton College of
New Jersey, USA, and Ph.D. Candidate at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of
Ireland, Galway.
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indicted. The purpose of this section is to display, chronologically, how the
United States has remained consistent with this position from post WWI to
the present.
II. POST WORLD WAR I
After WWI the United States dissented against the creation of an
international criminal tribunal to prosecute German war criminals,
particularly the former Kaiser of Germany, Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern, for
his participation in acts of aggression which instigated the war.' The
United States, however, did not argue against national prosecutions by any
occupying Allied power or the state of the nationality of the accused and
even favored a tribunal with "international character" if "formed by the
union of existing national military tribunals or commissions. 2  Such a
tribunal would not have been an "international" tribunal per se, but a
multinational tribunal. Moreover, the United States stated in its dissent that
"legal offenses were justiciable and liable to trial and punishment by
appropriate tribunals.",3 "Appropriate tribunals" would have been national
courts, state or military, by either the state that the accused was a national
citizen, or the state of an opposing army, or a tribunal combining national
jurisdiction voluntarily creating a multinational military tribunal.
The United States also argued strongly against the attempt to prosecute
persons high in authority for acts committed by their subordinates. In its
dissent, the United States stated that in the case of indirect responsibility for
violations of the laws and customs of war committed after the outbreak of
the war, there was an attempt to "punish certain persons, high in authority,
particularly the heads of enemy states, even though heads of States were not
hitherto legally responsible for the atrocious acts committed by subordinate
authorities."4 This "indirect responsibility" was an issue that the United
States would not compromise.5
For which reasons exactly the United States was so against indirect
responsibility are not clear. As the following pages will indicate, it is more
likely the United States did not favor the thought of its own nationals in
higher authority ever being indicted by an international tribunal. Without
1. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties: Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference American Journal of International
Law, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 127-151 (1920), reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 154 (1920) [hereinafter
Commission].
2. Id. at 129.
3. Id. at 128.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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precedent or support for the court, the possibility of a United States national
in higher authority ever being prosecuted in an international court was
diminished. In its dissent of an international criminal tribunal and the
prosecutions of persons in higher authority, the United States was not
concerned with the past but the future.
III. POST WORLD WAR II: NUREMBERG AND TOKYO
From 19 October through 30 October 1943, the United States, United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union met in Moscow and signed the Moscow
6Declaration, which was the first jointly signed proclamation that the Allied
powers would prosecute the hierarchy of German war criminals when the
war ended.7 On 24 March 1944, Franklin Roosevelt declared that:
[i]t is therefore fitting that we should again proclaim our
determination that none who participate in these acts of savagery
shall go unpunished. The United Nations have made it clear that
they will pursue the guilty and deliver them up in order that
Justice be done. That warning applies not only to the leaders but
also to their functionaries and subordinates in Germany and in the
satellite countries. All who knowingly take part in the
deportation of Jews to their death in Poland, or Norwegians and
French to their death in Germany are equally guilty with the
executioner. All who share the guilt shall share the punishment.
8
The words of President Roosevelt are quite clear that the United States
had changed its policy from post WWI when it dissented against
prosecuting those indirectly responsible for crimes. Not only was the
executioner responsible, but also all participants, including persons of
higher authority, were "equally guilty with the executioner." However, the
Allied victors would be careful to create a tribunal particularly for the
prosecution of certain persons in higher authority that they would agree.
WWII ended in Europe on 8 May 1945, but prosecution plans were
already underway. On 12 April 1945, President Roosevelt died, but his
successor, President Harry S. Truman, made no doubt that he wanted an
6. Declaration of German Atrocities, 9 DEP'T ST. BULL. Nov. 16,1943, Vol. IX, at 310-11.
7. WHITNEY R. HARRiS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR
CRIMINALS AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II AT NUREMBERG GERMANY 56 (Southern Methodist
University Press, 1999) (1954); see also, ARIEH J. KOCHAVI, PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG: ALLIED WAR
CRIMES POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT 56-57 (1998).
8. ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 12-13 (1945) [hereinafter Jackson].
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international military tribunal to prosecute the major Nazi war criminals.9
On 2 May 1945, President Truman officially designated Associate United
States Supreme Court Justice, Robert H. Jackson, to represent the United
States at the London Conference to lead the way in developing the London
Charter, and prosecuting Nazi war criminals on behalf of the United
States.'
On 26 June 1945, when the Allied victors met at the International
Conference on Military Trials [hereinafter London Conference] it was
obvious from the start that there would be friction between the Allied
victors in establishing not only the rules, but the goals of the IMT. The
Soviet Union insisted that all defendants be found guilty in the end."
Justice Jackson argued that "if we are going to have a trial, then it must be
an actual trial.' 12 He contemplated that the United States should prosecute
alone saying that "the idea of separate trials for each nation for the trial of
its separate groups of prisoners may be the easiest and most satisfactory
way of reconciling it.' 3 In early June, Justice Jackson made clear in his
report to the President that the United States case would preferably be
conducted in "association with others, but alone if necessary."' 4 The United
States had in its custody many German war criminals 15 and was capable of
successfully prosecuting them. Eventually, Justice Jackson would win the
argument and the Soviet Union agreed that the IMT would not be a show
trial with pre-decided verdicts.
The United States insisted that it was important to prosecute together
and establish a precedent that certain crimes would not be tolerated by the
international society. The United States remained consistent with its dissent
for creating an international criminal tribunal after WWI. The IMT was a
multinational military tribunal with "international character" and "formed
by the union of existing national military tribunals or commissions,"' 6
which is the type of court that the United States favored after WWI.
The United States did, however, change its policy regarding
prosecuting persons with higher authority who were indirectly responsible
9. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBuRG TRIALS 32 (1992) [hereinafter
Taylor].
10. 10 C.F.R. 4691, Exec. Order No. 9547.
11. Jackson, supra note 8, at 104-05.
12. Id. at 115.
13. Id.
14. ROBERT H. JACKSON, Atrocities and War Crimes, 12 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1071, 1073 (1945)
[hereinafter Robert].
15. Id.
16. Commission, supra note 1, at 129.
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for the atrocities committed by subordinates during the war. Justice
Jackson's aim was to prosecute the top Nazi officials, also known as the
"ringleaders", who were responsible for planning and ordering crimes.
Even though they may not have pulled the trigger or turned on the gas,
superiors were most responsible for the crimes committed if they were
planned or ordered. In his Report to the President, Justice Jackson
validated his position referring to United States national criminal justice
system by stating that: by not prosecuting higher authorities, it would be
"inconsistent with the position we take toward our own officials, who are
frequently brought to court at the suit of citizens who allege their rights to
have been invaded.'
7
Changing its policy on the prosecution of superiors indirectly
responsible for crimes committed by subordinates, the United States
foresaw that it, too, as well as other Allies could be called into the dock. To
prevent any of their own nationals from being prosecuted, Justice Jackson
and other Allied representatives at the London Conference agreed that their
own nationals would not be within the jurisdiction of the IMT; the first
sentence of Article 3 of the London Charter stated, "[n]either the Tribunal,
its members nor their alternates can be challenged by the prosecution, or by
the Defendants or their Counsel."'
18
The International Military Tribunal of the Far East (IMTFE) was
established to prosecute Japanese war criminals that committed atrocities
during WWII. Similar to the IMT, the jurisdiction of the IMTFE did not
cover any of the Allied nationals. Instead of a Tokyo conference, the
Charter of the IMTFE was an executive decree of General MacArthur on 19
January 1946.19 As a result, the United States had more control over it and
established in Article 5 that "[t]he Tribunal shall have the power to try and
punish Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals or as members of
organizations are charged with offences which include Crimes against
Peace. 2°
It is clear that the United States took the position that, consistent with
national courts the prosecutors of the multinational military tribunals had
the power to decide which defendants to prosecute. Therefore, even if it is
argued that it was possible for United States nationals to be prosecuted for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the tribunals, the United States prevented
this through its prosecutorial discretion. Justice Jackson, in his attempt to
17. Robert, supra note 14.
18. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949), art. 3.
19. SOLis HORwITZ, The Tokyo Trial, in No. 465, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, 471, 480
(Anne Winslow ed., Carnegie Endowment)(1950).
20. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 5, Jan. 19, 1946.
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legitimize prosecuting persons of higher authority, claimed that United
States officials are also brought to court for violating rights of others.2'
This was not true to the standard of international law. Never had a United
States official in a position of higher authority been prosecuted in a national
court for international crimes. One could argue the Trial of Henry Wirz
after the American Civil War,22 but Wirz was not an officer in the United
States Army; he was an officer in the Confederate Army. Further, the
United States did not prosecute military or political officials of higher
authority for crimes committed during WWII. Therefore, the United States
may have changed its policy since post WWI when it argued against
indirect criminal responsibility, but only for ad hoc courts, national or
multinational, when it had prosecutorial discretion.
IV. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
In 1946, while the IMT at Nuremberg had completed and the IMTFE
was still in session, there begun discussion concerning the creation of a
permanent ICC or a court with international criminal jurisdiction. With the
exception of much criticism, the IMT was considered a success, overall. As
a result, the General Assembly [hereinafter GA], instructed the International
Law Commission [hereinafter ILC], to establish basic principles of
international law from the IM4T.23  The GA adopted the Principles of
International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal in 1950.24
The GA also developed a committee to consider the creation of a
permanent ICC and to draft a statute for the court.25  The committee
reported to the GA in 1952 and stated that a permanent ICC was feasible.26
Unfortunately, with the lack of a definition for the crime of aggression and
the height of the Cold War, the project was suspended indefinitely.27
21. Robert, supra note 14.
22. Proceedings of a Special Military Commission Convened at Washington D.C. in
pursuance of the following Special Orders No. 453, 23 August 1865, National Archives, Washington D.
C., RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), Court Martial Case Files
1809-1894, MM2975, Box 1264, Folder #1 mm 2975.
23. G.A. Res. 177(Il)(aX1947), U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
24. U.N.Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 374, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
25. G.A. Res. 174(1)(a), U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
26. Report of the Committee on Int'l Criminal Jurisdiction A/2136, reprinted in 2 BENJAMIN
B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOwARD WORLD PEACE-A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYsiS 337 (1980) [hereinafter Ferencz].
27. G.A. Res. 897 (IX) (1954).
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Preceding the instructions to the ILC by the GA to consider the
creation of a permanent ICC, there was much debate during the drafting of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide,28 adopted in 1948. Originally, Article VI of the Genocide
Convention legally obligated states to an ICC if genocide,29 or other acts of
genocide,30 were committed. This legal obligation of states to an ICC was
controversial and many states, including the Soviet "bloc," argued such a
court violated state sovereignty and states were only obligated to courts
already established under national jurisdiction. The United States
representatives, however, favored adopting a convention that included
establishing an ICC.
31
Prior to the Genocide Convention, a draft convention was prepared by
the United Nations (UN) Secretariat. The Secretariat's draft referred to the
ICC in Article IX as obligatory for state parties to the Convention under
two conditions. Article IX read as follows:
The High contracting Parties pledge themselves to commit all
persons guilty of genocide under this Convention for trial to an
international court in the following cases: When they are
unwilling to try such offenders themselves under Article VII or to
grant their extradition under Article VIII. If the acts of genocide
have been committed by individuals acting as organs of the State
or with the support of toleration of the state.
32
The following article described the ICC either "having jurisdiction in
all matters connected with international crimes" 33 or jurisdiction over the
crime of genocide, only.
On 3 March 1948, the Economic and Social Council [hereinafter
ECOSOC] created the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide to develop a draft
convention. The United States representative, Mr. John Maktos, chaired the
28. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, February 12,
1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
29. Id. at 280-282.
30. Id.
31. LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 151
(1991) [hereinafter LeBlanc].
32. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, U.N.
Doc. E/447, 8 (June 26, 1947) [hereinafter Crime of Genocide].
33. Id.
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Ad Hoc Committee.3 4 It held meetings from 5 April through 10 May 1948
and published its report on 24 May 1948.35 Although the Ad Hoc
Committee previously decided to use the Secretariat's draft convention as a
basis, which stipulated that "[t]he High contracting Parties pledge
themselves to commit all persons guilty of genocide under this Convention
for trial to an international court, ' 36 it later decided only to take it into
consideration.37 The Ad Hoc Committee would drastically revise the
Secretariat drafts' provisions regarding an ICC.
38
During the discussions, there was more agreement on the principle of
an international criminal jurisdiction rather than an ICC.39 John Maktos
proposed the creation of an ICC that would have a complementary role to
national courts. His proposal stated: "Assumption of jurisdiction by the
international tribunal shall be subject to a finding by the tribunal that the
state in which the crime was committed has failed to take adequate
measures to punish the crime."
40
The United States proposal was defeated in a vote of 5-1 and was not
included in the draft convention. 41  The mention of an ICC in the Draft
Convention was subtle. Article VII reads as follows: "Persons charged
with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article IV shall be
tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act
was committed or by a competent international tribunal.
'' 2
The majority of states were not ready for an ICC and agreed that more
research had to be completed. To prevent the Genocide Convention from
not being adopted, the United States proposed that the problem of the ICC
be dealt with in a separate Convention to be drafted by the ILC 43 and the
court, if created, would have jurisdiction over states that accepted
jurisdiction through ratification. The GA adopted the Genocide Convention
on 9 December 1948. Article VI stated that persons accused of genocide
would be prosecuted by the state on which territory the crime was
34. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Report of the
Committee and Draft Convention Drawn up by the Committee, U.N. Doc. E/794, 1 (April 5-May 10,
1948) [hereinafter Ad Hoc].
35. Id.
36. Crime of Genocide, supra note 32.
37. Ad Hoc, supra note 34, at 4.
38. Ferencz, supra note 26, at 12.
39. Ad Hoc, supra note 34, at 30.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 56.
43. Ferencz, supra note 26, at 10.
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committed or "by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction
with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its
jurisdiction. ' 44
The completion of the Genocide Convention was not the completion of
internal debates within the United States concerning Article VI. 45 There was
much urging to ratify the Genocide Convention for two reasons: (1)
ratifying the Convention would not contract the United States to the
jurisdiction of a future ICC. There was no court at the time and if one came
to effect, the United States did not have to accept its jurisdiction;46 (2)
Genocide had never existed, nor could it ever exist in the United States
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights.47
During the 1950s Senate Hearings, opponents of Article VI feared the
Genocide Convention and any future ICC could be used politically against
the United States, including national racial segregation. Even though
segregation did not include the special intent dolus specialis to destroy the
group, in whole or in part, required under Article II,4 8 there was certainly
fear that the argument could be made.
The fear of politically motivated accusations of genocide by the United
States was soon justified. On 17 December 1951, the Civil Rights Congress
submitted a petition to the UN titled "We Charge Genocide: The Crime of
Government Against the Negro People." 49  The allegation stated "that
within an unspecified number of years 10,000 negroes were killed and that
the US Government intends the destruction of 15 million negroes. 50
Earlier in the year, the United States learned that the Soviet Union was
aware of the accusation and stated, "[i]t is to be expected that the accusation
of genocide vs. the American Negro will be publicized by all means within
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), regardless whether the
charge is formally accepted on the GA agenda."'I
44. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. VI, Jan. 12,
1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
45. See generally The Genocide Convention: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 81st Cong. (1950).
46. Id. at44.
47. Id. at 53.
48. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 44, at
art. II.
49. See generally WE CHARGE GENOCIDE: THE CRIME OF GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE
NEGRO PEOPLE (William L. Patterson ed,. 1970).
50. Letter from I.B.D. N.Y. Kohler to John Devine, Possible Lines of Approach to Meet the
Communist Charge of Attempted Genocide Against the Negros of the U.S.A. by the U.S. Government
(Mar. 17, 1951) (on file with author).
51. Id. at 1.
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Though nothing significant developed from the petition against the
United States for the crime of genocide against American Negroes, this was
an example that countries against each other could use charges of
international crimes politically. States at the Genocide Convention,
particularly the Soviet "bloc" understood that some of their national laws of
oppression could arguably be considered international crimes, if not
genocide. The United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention for
nearly forty years after its adoption by the GA. On 23 November 1988 the
United States submitted its ratification of the Genocide Convention.
However, an earlier resolution was passed concerning the ratification. 2 In
the resolution, the United States confirmed that its nationals would not be
within the jurisdiction of any future ICC by stating:
That with regard to the reference to an international penal
tribunal in Article VI of the Convention, the United States
declares that it reserves the right to effect its participation in any
such tribunal only by a treaty entered into specifically for that
purpose with the advice and consent of the Senate.
53
The debates within the United States Senate from 1950 until
ratification of the Convention in 1988 remained consistent regarding an
ICC in Article VI. Opponents openly wished not to have any possible
connection to such a court. Proponents agreed that an ICC should not have
jurisdiction over United States nationals unless contracted by a separate
treaty. In either case, there was no strong support for an ICC that would
have jurisdiction over United States nationals.
V. AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR IRAQ
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait beginning the First Gulf War.
The following day, the Office of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the
United States Army began to informally collect evidence that United States
citizens were taken hostage in Kuwait by Iraqi military personnel and
forcibly deported to Iraq.5 4 In December 1990, United States hostages were
released and, on 24 December 1990, the United States formally opened an
52. LeBlanc, supra note 31, at 253.
53. Id. at 253-54.
54. Memorandum from John H. McNeill, Deputy General Counsel, Int'l Affairs &
Intelligence, to Judge Advocate Gen., Dep't of the Army (Nov. 19, 1992) (on file with author)
[hereinafter McNeill].
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investigation into violations of international humanitarian law by the Iraqi
military."
It was hoped that the evidence obtained would be used in future
prosecutions of Iraqi military personnel who committed war crimes.56
President George H. W. Bush publicly hinted at prosecuting Saddam
Hussein in October 1990, when he called the Iraqi president "Hitler
Revisited." 57  He subsequently referred to the Nuremberg Trials, which
prosecuted Nazi war criminals after WWII."
President George H. W. Bush's administration was unsure how to
pursue a war crimes tribunal. With the exception of the IMT and the
IMTFE, no such international criminal tribunal had ever existed. The
United States did not favor prosecuting Iraqi war criminals unilaterally as
this would reflect "victors' justice"; but the United States also did not favor
including the United Nations in the process.59 M. Cherif Bassiouni, writes
that he was contacted by a partner of a Saudi law firm in Riyadh to solicit
his views on a proposal for an Arab League initiative to establish an Arab
war crimes tribunal for Iraq.60 The idea of the proposal was assumed to
have originated from a United States government source.61  The Arab
League did not pursue a war crimes tribunal for Iraq as a result of
uninterested Arab governments.62
55. Id. at 4-5.
56. Id. at 8; see also Bob Cohn & Ginny Carroll, To the Victors Go the Trials, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 4, 1991, at 52; Tony Mauro, War-Crimes File Against Saddam is Building, USA TODAY, Feb. 13,
1991, at A4.
57. Secretary Baker, Iraqi Atrocities in Kuwait, I U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE DISPATCH, 199, 205
(1990); Cohn & Carroll, supra note 60; Gerald F. Seib, Bush Hints US to Seek War-Crime Trial of
Iraq's Leaders for Actions in Kuwait, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1990, at A8; Neal Ascherson, The Trial of
Saddam Hussein: Retribution Belongs to His Victims in Iraq, INDPT. (London), Oct. 21, 1990, at 19;
Peter Kellner, Why Iraq War Crimes May go Unpunished, INDPT. (London), Feb. 1, 1991, atl9
[hereinafter Kellner]; see also Louis Ren6 Beres, Toward Prosecution of Iraqi Crimes Under
International Law: Jurisprudential Foundations and Jurisdictional Choices, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 127,
127-34 (1991); Louis Rend Beres, Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes: Fulfilling the Expectations of
International Law After the Gulf War, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L 425, 426, 427 (1992); Louis Rend Beres,
Iraqi Crimes and International Law: The Imperative to Punish, 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 335,
345-48 (1993); Louis Rend Beres, Iraqi Crimes During and After the Gulf War: The Imperative
Response ofInternational Law, 15 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 675,675-89 (1993).
58. Seib, supra note 57; Ascherson, supra note 57.
59. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Events Leading to the Creation of the LHT, reprinted in MICHAEL P.
SCHARF & GREGORY S. MCNEAL, SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI
HIGH TRIBUNAL 11 (2006).
60. Id. at 11 & 395 n.34.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Id.
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For the following decade, the United States would continue to struggle
over methods to bring Saddam Hussein to justice. After the SC established
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the United States Senate passed Senate Resolution 78 in March
1998, urging the creation of a United Nations international criminal tribunal
to prosecute Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials for war crimes.63 The
Senate resolution stated that the President of the United States should:
1) call for the creation of a commission under the auspices of the
United Nations to establish an international record of the criminal
culpability of Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials;
2) call for the United Nations to form an international criminal
tribunal for the purpose of indicting, prosecuting, and
imprisoning Saddam Hussein and any other Iraqi officials who
may be found responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide,
and other violations of international humanitarian law; and
3) upon the creation of a commission and international criminal
tribunal, take steps necessary, including the reprogramming of
funds, to ensure United States support for efforts to bring Saddam
Hussein and other Iraqi officials to justice.64
The Senate hoped that President Clinton would take a more proactive
approach to bring Saddam Hussein to trial by persuading the SC to establish
an international criminal tribunal for Iraq just as it did for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.65 In 1999, the United States pursued criminal
charges against Saddam Hussein and company.66 David Scheffer, the
United States Ambassador for War Crimes, stated that the goal of the
United States was to bring Saddam Hussein to justice.67 Ultimately, Russia
and China did not support the creation of an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal for Iraq and opposed any such tribunal.68
63. S. Con. Res. 78, 105th Cong. (1998); see also Mary Ann Akers, Senate Calls for UN Trial
of War Criminal Saddam, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at A03; Helen Dewar, Senate Urges Tribunal to
Try Saddam: Iraqi is Targeted as War Criminal, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1998, at A20.
64. S. Con. Res. 78.
65. Walter Pincus, Senators Urge Undermining of Saddam: Republicans Propose $38 Million
for Foes ofIraqi Leader, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1998, at A6.
66. Warren P. Strobel & Kevin Whitelaw, Saddam Hussein and the Bar of Justice: Can
Lawyers Succeed where Bombs Failed?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 25, 1999, at 40.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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VI. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
On 12 December 1992, the United States formally took the position
that it was in favor of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal. United
States Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, "publicly called for the
creation of a Nuremberg-like tribunal to try persons believed to be
responsible for atrocities in the former Yugoslavia,"69 and accused
Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Ratko Mladic of committing
international crimes during the ethnic cleansing. Again, the United States
promoted an ad hoc international criminal tribunal similar to Nuremberg
just as it had with Iraq two years earlier.
President George H. W. Bush was reluctant to call for an international
criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Until the end of his
presidential term, discussions continued about how to bring Saddam
Hussein to trial and he had made known that he did not want to have a UN
ad hoc tribunal for Iraq.70 Finally, with forty days left of President George
H. W. Bush's presidency, his Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger,
called for an ad hoc tribunal.71 When the Clinton administration entered the
White House, "Ambassador [Madeline] Albright's first initiative at the
SC.. . in February of 1993 was to create a war crimes tribunal for the
Balkans. So as far as the Clinton Administration is concerned, we did it as
issue number one. 72
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter is titled "Action with
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression, '73 which authorizes the SC to take necessary actions "to
maintain international peace and security. '74 There is no specific reference
of the power to develop tribunals; however, there is the inherent right of
69. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Names Figures to be Prosecuted Over War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES
INT'L, Dec. 17, 1992, at AI [hereinafter Sciolino]; see also MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE
STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 51 (1997); 1
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 29 (1995); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 19 (2006).
70. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 59, at 11.
71. Sciolino, supra note 69, at Al; see also Scharf, supra note 69; 1 Morris & Scharf, supra
note 69; Schabas, supra note 69.
72. Interview with David Scheffer, former US Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, Ir. (June
24, 2008) [hereinafter Scheffer].
73. U.N. Charter ch. VII.
74. Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of international Law, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 79 (1994).
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individual or collective self-defense.75 Therefore, there is consensus that if
the SC has the authority to use force, which should be a last option, it also
has the authority to create a judicial institution.
While the United States was consulting with its allies at the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights in February 1993, France was
circulating a draft SC resolution in New York, which would create a
Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal.76 The United States immediately began
working on a response to the French Draft, which requested the SC to
approve and establish a Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal and subsequently
approve the tribunal's statute. 7  On 22 February 1993, the SC adopted
Resolution 808 establishing an international criminal tribunal "for the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991. ,78
Seventeen states other than the United States submitted draft statute
proposals to the UN Secretary General for consideration.79 On 8 May 1993,
the SC adopted the tribunal's statute, officially activating the ICTY to bring
to justice "persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991.8o
Eventually Justice Richard Goldstone was appointed Chief Prosecutor
of the ICTY. Soon after, he was invited to the UN in New York for a
briefing.8' He received great support from the United States when he
arrived in New York. He stated:
I was warmly welcomed by Madeleine Albright, who had played
the leading role in having the tribunal established. Her
continued support for the work of the Yugoslavia tribunal, and
later the Rwanda tribunal, was crucial to their success. She
appointed one of her senior advisors, David Scheffer, to take
special responsibility for moving the work of the tribunal
forward. David became a friend and adviser to me, especially
with regard to my contacts with the various branches of the
75. U.N. Charter art. 51.
76. Scharf, supra note 69, at 52.
77. Id. at 53.
78. S.C. Res. 808, 11 , U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
79. Scharf, supra note 69, at 55.
80. Res. 827, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
81. RIcHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANrrY: REFLECIONS OF A WAR CRIMES
INVESTIGATOR 76 (Yale University Press 2000).
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United States administration. His commitment to the work of
both tribunals was deep and supportive.
82
The ICTY would have failed in the early years if not for the
contribution by the United States. Justice Goldstone stated that when he
arrived at The Hague Convention there were forty staff members, twenty-
three were from the United States. When he left his post as prosecutor,
there were 240 staff members and still twenthy-three were from the United
States.83 The United States probably would have given more funds and
personnel initially, but the UN would not allow this to prevent any view
that the ICTY was a United States-controlled tribunal.84
United States Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, was the driving
force behind United States' support for the ICTY. She once lived in the
Balkans and felt a connection to the territory. Justice Goldstone praised her
helpfulness and the overall contribution of the United States. He stated that
the United States gave him "whatever I wanted," and that "it was
extraordinary to be able to reach an agreement with the United States to get
intelligence information," and that no one would have thought the United
States would have shared intelligence with an international prosecutor from
South Africa. But the United States did share its intelligence and it was
very helpful. Without the United States' political and economic muscle,
there wouldn't have been a Yugoslavia tribunal. There was a genuine
certainty on the part of the United States to have a working, successful
international criminal tribunal."5
David Scheffer also believed that the United States was the only state
that did its fair share of initially contributing to the ICTY. "In those very,
very early months and first couple of years of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, we
were not really getting the other governments to step forward and pitch in
their fair share in support of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. 8 6 He further stated,
"[t]he United States was sort of the vanguard of pressing other governments
to focus and support the Yugoslav Tribunal.
87
The compliments by Justice Goldstone describing the United States'
support for the ICTY resembled its support for the IMT after WWII.
Another resemblance is that when creating the statutes for both tribunals,
82. Id. at 78.
83. Interview with Richard J. Goldstone, former prosecutor for the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Georgetown Law School, (Mar. 19, 2008).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Scheffer, supra note 72.
87. Id.
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the United States had no intention of a United States national being
prosecuted. Yet, a mistake was made with the ICTY statute and
indictments of United States nationals were discussed.
The ICTY was created "for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991."88 This would include UN
personnel and members conducting North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) missions. In 1999, NATO dropped bombs on Kosovo attempting
to end ethnic cleansing against the Albanians by the Serbs. The Bombings
were conducted from excessively high altitudes and a high number of
innocent civilians were killed. As a result, several nongovernment
organizations (NGO) and legal scholars called for the indictment of NATO
personnel, including United States officials of higher authority.89 The
prosecutor of the ICTY at the time, Louise Arbour, and her replacement,
Carla Del Ponte, "both insisted that the leaders of NATO, the United States,
and any other parties involved in the Balkan wars were fair game for
prosecution-if grounds were found." 90
While the media was publicizing the NATO airstrikes and the calls for
the indictments of United States officials, on 22 May 1999, ICTY
Prosecutor Louise Arbour presented an indictment for confirmation against
Slobodan Milosevic. 9' On 24 May 1999, Slobodan Milosevic was officially
indicted for crimes against humanity and violations of international
humanitarian law committed in Kosovo from 1 January 1999 to 20 June
1999.92 The NATO bombings had stopped in early June and Milosevic
would later use the bombings in his defense stating that they were
responsible for the mass killings and fleeing of innocent civilians in
Kosovo.
In January 2000, President George W. Bush became President of the
United States. His Secretary of State, Colin Powell, worked hard for the
transfer of Slobodan Milosevic from a Belgrade prison to the ICTY.
93
Powell pledged $181 million to be committed at a donors' conference
88. C. Res. 827, Preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
89. Jerome Socolovsky, White House Blasts Kosovo Inquiry, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE,
JAN. 4,2000 available at LExISNEXIS.
90. JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMINALS IN THE HAGUE
208 (University of Chicago Press 2003).
91. Press Release, Justice Louise Arbour, Prosecutor ICTY, The Hague, JL'PIU/404-E (May
27, 1999) available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7764 (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
92. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment, available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ii990524e.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
93. JOHN HAGAN, supra note 90, at 207-12.
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created to assist the former Yugoslavia economy and confirmation that
Milosevic would be transferred to ICTY.94 If not, the Bush administration
made clear it would not participate in the donors' conference. 95 Slobodan
Milosevic arrived at the ICTY on 28 June 2001.96 No United States
nationals were indicted by the ICTY.
VII. THE UNITED STATES AND THE ICC
On 15 June 1998, the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an ICC commenced in Rome, Italy.97 At least 160
state delegations and international and nongovernmental organizations were
present at the conference.98 The conference ended on 17 July 1998, with a
vote for the adoption of a treaty for the ICC requested by the United
States.99 As a result, 120 states voted in favor of the treaty, twenty-one
abstained, and seven voted against the treaty1 °° The Rome Statute of the
ICC had been adopted and the majority of states were ready to make the
ICC reality once sixty states ratified the statute. 01 The United States,
however, was one of seven states that had voted against the treaty.0 2
On 31 December 2000, President Clinton signed the Rome Statute,
which was one of the final decisions made by the administration prior to
leaving the White House. He signed so the United States could remain in
subsequent negotiations concerning the ICC. However, soon after the
Rome Statute received its sixtieth ratification, on 6 May 2002 the Bush
Administration sent a letter addressed to UN Secretary General, Kofi
94. Id. at 208.
95. Id. at 210.
96. For the prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic, see CHRIS STEPHEN, JUDGMENT DAY: THE
TRIAL OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (2005); KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE
POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS Ch. 3 (2008); MICHAEL P. SCHARF & WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL: A COMPANION (2002).
97. Colonel Stuart W. Risch, Hostile Outsider or Influential Insider? The United States and
the International Criminal Court, 2009 ARMY LAW. 61, 67 at n.26 (2009).
98. Id. at 69.
99. Rosaria Vigorito, The Evolution and Establishment of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), 30 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 92, 93 (2002).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Annan, formally renouncing any involvement in a treaty setting up the ICC
by withdrawing the signature of the United States from the Rome Statute.1
0 3
After the "unsigning" of its signature to the Rome Statute, the United
States vigorously tried to prevent the ICC from becoming a legitimate
judicial system. On 2 August 2002, the United States passed the American
Service Members' Protection Act, which would allow the United States to
use military force against the ICC to free a citizen of the United States.'0 4 It
also forced many states that received financial and military support from the
United States to sign bilateral immunity agreements under Article 98 of the
Rome Statute. This was an attempt to ensure that state parties to the Rome
Statute would not transfer an indicted citizen of the United States to the
ICC.
There are several issues the United States has with the ICC.
10 5
However, the issue of concern in this study is that the United States, by
ratifying the Rome Statute, would be willing to allow the possibility of
investigations and indictments against its military or civilian officials. It is
not. In 1993, the United States supported the initiative to create the ICC
10 6
with the view that it would be under the control of the SC similar to the
ICTY and ICTR, which were created around the same time. In 1998 at the
Rome Conference, the United States delegates pressed for the SC to have a
role of overseeing possible "overzealous" prosecutors to prevent possible
103. Jonathon Wright, US. Renounces Obligations to International Court, REUTERS, May 6,
2002, pg. IL available at http://www.geocities.com/honestabepolitics/bushPresWorldCourt2002.html
(last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
104. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
29-30 (Cambridge University Press 3d ed., 2007).
105. See ALTON FRYE, TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? A COUNCIL POLICY
INITIATIVE (Alton Frye ed., Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. 1999); Dominic McGoldrick, Political
Opposition to the ICC-The United States in DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, PETER ROWE, AND ERIC
DONNELLY (eds.), THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
400, 401 (Hart Publishing 2004); JASON RALPH, DEFENDING THE SOCIETY OF STATES: WHY AMERICA
OPPOSES THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND IT VISION OF WORLD SOCIETY (Oxford University
Press 2007); Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 124
(2001); SARAH B. SEWALL & CARL KAYSEN (eds.), THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rowman and Littlefield, Inc.
2000); WILLIAM DRISCOLL, JOSEPH ZOMPETTI, AND SUZETTE W. ZOMPETTI (eds.), THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE (International
Debate Education Association 2004); see also Marc Grossman, Under Sec'y for Political Affairs, U.S.
Dept. of State, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, American Foreign Policy
and the International Criminal Court (May 6, 2002); Jennifer K. Elsea, U.S. Policy Regarding the
International Criminal Court, Report for Congress, updated Aug. 29, 2006 Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress.
106. See S. J. Res. 32, 103rd Cong. (1993); S. J. Res. 93, 103rd Cong. (1993).
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politicized prosecutions against United States nationals.'17 The United
States lost this debate and subsequently lost the vote to prevent the adoption
of the Rome Statute.
The Rome Conference can mistakenly be viewed as a success for the
United States, since it was David Scheffer 08 who had pressed for the
principle of complementarity, which was adopted, and Lieutenant Colonel
William Lietzau' °9 who pressed for the inclusion of Elements of Crimes,
which was also adopted and finalized at a later date. Yet, the United States
lost at Rome. The United States did not want an ICC that could possibly
indict a United States national. If the United States had gotten what it
wanted and the ICC was controlled by the SC preventing possible
indictments against the United States nationals through political muscle,
other issues and concerns the United States has regarding the ICC would
not be as relevant. 10
Crimes against humanity and questionably genocide have occurred in
Darfur in the past few years. The United States wanted an international
criminal tribunal for Darfur as the mechanism for accountability.,
Without sufficient support on United States' proposals, the SC voted to
refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC, which it is authorized to do under
Article 13.' 12 Rather than use its veto power, the United States abstained
allowing the resolution to pass, yet, only after proper safeguards were
inserted protecting non-party states to the ICC. "3
The abstention is not to be considered a warming to the ICC by the
United States.' 4 The United States had always preferred the SC referring
situations to the ICC. If this were how the ICC triggered cases, the United
States would have ratified since most of their arguments have been
107. See Elsea, supra note 105, at 6.
108. David Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Dept. of State, Address
Before the Comm. of Conscience, Responding to Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (April 22,
1998).
109. William K. Lietzau, International Criminal Law After Rome: Concerns from a US.
Military Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 121 (2001).
110. See generally William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal
Court: It's All About the Security Council 15 E.J.I.L. 701, 701-720 (2004) (concerning the relationship
between the SC and ICC regarding the United States' policy).
11. See Elsea, supra note 105, at 22.
112. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998) 11, 3 art. 13(b), A/CONF. 183/9.
113. C. Res. 1593, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005).
114. But see Jess Bravin, US. Warms to Hague Tribunal, WALL ST. J. June 14,2006, at A4.
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dependent on SC and ICC relations." 5 However, since 2006 the United
States has lessened its tone against the ICC and has acknowledged that it is
willing to work with the court on a case-by-case basis when the ICC and the
United States share a common interest, for example the situation in
Darfur.'
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VIII. CONCLUSION
It is yet to be determined if the United States policy on international
criminal tribunals will change in the near future. It has been embedded in
the United States culture that exceptions should be made for its military or
political misconduct that result in war crimes, and if prosecutions occur,
they occur within national courts, including military court martial. If the
United States is to become a state party to the ICC, this culture will have to
change. It is "implausible to seek total US immunity from investigation and
prosecution for atrocity crimes as a state party to the Rome Statute.""' 7
It is also implausible that a United States national will not find
him/herself indicted by the ICC if the United States ratifies the Rome
Statute. The United States has a very functional legal system, particularly
its military justice system. It also has a history of prosecuting war crimes
committed by its military service members. However, this history is not in
good-standing international criminal law and its continuation would not
meet the standards of the ICC. When the United States prosecutes military
personal for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the defendants are
not persons of higher authority. They usually consist of persons of
subordinate authority. The goal of the ICC is to prosecute the very persons
that the United States has been unwilling to prosecute regarding its own
nationals. This unwillingness has been shown through its consistent history
of participating in international criminal tribunals only when there is no
substantial risk of United States nationals being indicted.
115. See generally William A. Schabas, supra note 104, at 701-20.
116. See Alexis Arieff, "International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy
Issues" Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 12 September 2008, (CRS RL34665,
Library of Congress); see also Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Declares Intention to
Cnsider Sanctions to Obtain Sudan's Full Compliance with Security, Disarment Obligations on Darfur,
U.N. Doc. SC/8191 (Sept. 18,2004).
117. DAVID SCHEFFER & JOHN HuTsoN, STRATEGY FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 10 (2008).
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